The Innovation in Concept of the Erga-Omnisisation of International Law

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Abstract

In international law, the concept of erga omnes obligations refers to specifically determined obligations that states have towards the international community as a whole. In general legal theory the concept “erga omnes” (Latin: „in relation to everyone”) has origins dating as far back as Roman law and is used to describe obligations or rights towards all. In municipal law it has the effect towards all in another, general context. The concept is very important because in today’s structure of international society, composed of independent entities giving rise, as a rule, to legal relations on a consensual basis, erga omnes obligations can further enable the International Court of Justice to go beyond reciprocal relations among states based on consent in further developing international law on the basis of a natural law approach. By its very nature this affects the freedom of state consent and the sovereignty of states. The ICJ, in its 2012 judgment in the Belgium v. Senegal case, innovated erga omnes parties in much more comprehension than the old meaning. Now and at the future, the new approach of ICJ would be referred and expanded in International law and international human rights law. This paper will try to shed some light on this concept by analyzing its meaning in international law, starting from its appearance, consequent development and its position at the present time.

Key Words: Erga omnes obligations, ratio decidendi, obiter dicta, stare decisis, jus cogens norms, aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, torture, self-determination, international court of justice.

1. Introduction

This article seeks to critically evaluate the idea of the erga omnes in international law. During the last two decades, eminent scholars from both sides of the Atlantic have argued that international law is undergoing a profound transformation owing to the impact that erga omnes have on general international law and its special regimes. Although not all scholars agree as to the extent of that impact, there seems to be a consensus that, indeed, erga omnes obligations are a source of change in international law. As appears from this briefest of descriptions, the fascination of this concepts is some extent due to its “mysterious” character, brought out not the least by the Latin terms denoting them. As was recently noted by James Crawford, “[l]awyers have a habit of putting labels, especially Latin labels, on things …. We tend to say ‚jus cogens’ to a norm and everyone nods their
The concepts of obligations *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* fascinate international lawyers, who cannot, it seems, refrain from exploring ever new facets. While both have a long pedigree, in their present ‘incarnation’, they were launched onto the international plane about four decades ago, and in rather dramatic fashion: In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), after much debate, recognized that certain rules of international law (among which the drafters mentioned those outlawing the use of force, slavery, piracy or genocide) admitted of “no derogation” and clarified that treaties violating such “peremptory norms” would be void. One year later, In its dictum on the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ, as the primary judicial organ of the United Nations, gave rise to the concept of *erga omnes* obligations in international law. The ICJ adapted a similar idea to the field of law enforcement, by cryptically pointing to an “essential distinction” between the regular obligations of a State and those “towards the international community as a whole”. The latter, it went on, included obligations deriving “from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including ... heads sagely ... Similarly with obligations *erga omnes*. The *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* concepts are often presented as two sides of the same coin. Yet precisely because *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* are so often placed on a pedestal, it seems necessary to re-focus debates on the effects that this concept entails. This we attempt to do in the following sections, which single out three distinct areas in which the two concepts of *jus cogens* and *erga omnes* modify the regime of international responsibility applicable between States and international organizations.

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3 Articles 53, 64 VCLT. The examples are mentioned in the ILC’s Commentary to Draft Article 50 (the precursor to Article 53 VCLT): see *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1966, vol. II, at 248.


4 - *Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1970, 3*, at para. 33
protection from slavery and racial discrimination”, which were “the concern of all States.”
And further: “In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”

In its dictum on the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ, as the primary judicial organ of the UN, gave rise to the concept of
erga omnes obligations in international law. In this judgment the Court drew a distinction
between the erga omnes obligations that a state has towards the international community as a
whole and in whose protection all states have a legal interest, and the obligations of a state vis-à-
vis another state.

For many years, academic enthusiasm for the concepts of jus cogens and erga omnes met with a
considerable degree of scepticism among those professing to concern themselves only with ‘real
law’: theoretically interesting though they might have been, ‘real lawyers’ considered both concepts
to be of very limited practical relevance at best. To mention just two prominent statements, Ian
Brownlie at one point characterized jus cogens as a “vehicle that hardly leaves the garage” while
Hugh Thirlway viewed obligations erga omnes as a “purely theoretical category”.

Things have changed, though, and if anything, the problem today (even among courts or other
players engaged in the business of the allegedly ‘real law’) is one of ‘over-use’ – of vehicles leaving
garages all too often, as it were. Whereas Articles 53, 64 VCLT indeed have hardly been invoked in
practice, ‘Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention ‘is of real relevance today: over the last
decades, international and domestic courts have asserted an ever wider range of (often controversial)
jus cogens effects, in fields as diverse as jurisdiction, immunities, diplomatic protection,

1 - Ibid., paras. 33-34.
6- Ibid., para. 33.
3 - I. Brownlie and Commonwealth Secretariat, The Human Right to Development: Study Prepared
   Crawford and V. Lowe, British Year Book of International Law 2008 (Oxford University Press,
   2009): 1, at 102 (also describing it as ‘an empty gesture’ [p. 100]).
5 - H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice – Part One’, ibid.: 1,
   at 102 (also describing it as ‘an empty gesture’ [p. 100]). With respect to erga omnes, see e.g.
   Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ
   32, para. 33) is frequently invoked for more than it can bear. [...] That dictum was directed to a
   very specific issue of jurisdictional locus standi. [...] It has nothing to do with imposing
   substantive obligations on third parties to a case.’
6 - There is considerable support for the proposition that all States are entitled to exercise universal
   jurisdiction over breaches of peremptory norms, see e.g. ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v.
   Furundžija, Case IT-95-17/1-T (at para. 156); House of Lords, Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. 198 (per
   Lord Browne-Wilkinson); ibid., 275 (per Lord Millett); Brussels Court of First Instance, Order In re
   Pinochet, 119 ILR 356–357; US Court of Appeals (District of Columbia), Princz v. Germany,
den Wyngaert (para. 45). As regards ‘European’ jurisprudence, see especially the Judgment of the
Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005 — Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission (Case T-306/01), where the Court of First Instance declared that it was
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reservations to treaties,3 prosecution of human rights abuses,4 or extradition.5 With respect to obligations erga omnes, a careful perusal of the ICJ’s jurisprudence suggests that the concept has become a legal vademecum prescribed to produce a wide array of legal effects: not only (as in Barcelona Traction) in the field of law enforcement, but also justifying third-party effects of treaties or resolutions,6 an extensive understanding of the territorial scope of obligations,1 and alleged duties ‘empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible’ (at para. 226). The CFI found no violations of jus cogens to have occurred, with regards to the imposition of sanctions. In 2008, the judgment was reversed on the merits Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union and EC Commission, 3 C.M.L.R. 41 (2008), with the Court however declaring that it had no power to review the lawfulness of resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII, ‘even if that review were to be limited to the examination of the compatibility of that resolution with jus cogens’ (para. 287). All in all, a victory for fundamental rights protection, but a defeat for jus cogens.

1- See e.g. the ICTY’s Furundzija judgment (op.cit), at para. 156; Judge Wald’s dissent in Princz (103 ILR 618); House of Lords, Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. 278 (per Lord Millett) and 290 (per Lord Phillips); ICJ, Arrest Warrant case, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, Diss.Op. Al-Khasawneh (para. 7); Diss.Op. van den Wyngaert (para. 23) (all controversially holding that international law precludes the plea of immunity in case of jus cogens breaches).

2- See e.g. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4, 506 and Add. 1 (2000), at paras. 75–93, especially draft article 4 (1) (proclaiming a duty of States to exercise diplomatic protection in case of violations of jus cogens norms). Cf. also the Abbasi case before the (English) Court of Appeal, [2002] EWCA Civ. 159, paras. 28, 41.

3- See e.g. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 of 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6; similarly the opinions of Judges Padillo Nervo and Tanaka and Judge ad hoc Sorensen in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, at 97, 182, and 248 respectively.

4- In its Furundzija judgment (op.cit.), a trial chamber of the ICTY e.g. took the view that ‘[i]t would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State . . . condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty law’ (at para. 155). See further the Pinochet case before the Spanish National Criminal Court (Audencia Nacional), 119 ILR 344.

5- See e.g. Swiss Supreme Court (Tribunal Fédéral), Bufano et al., Recueil Officiel, Vol. 108, I, 408–413 (para. 8a); Lynas, ibid., Vol. 101, 541 (para. 7b); Sener, ibid., Vol. 109, I, 72 (para. 6aa) (all holding that where an individuals faced violations of jus cogens rights abroad, he/she could not be extradited).

6- See e.g. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, 56, at para. 126: “the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia are opposable to all States in the sense of barring erga omnes the legality of a situation which is maintained in violation of international law“. This indeed is the traditional understanding of the term ‘erga omnes’, which had been common prior to the 1970 Barcelona
The new approach of ICJ, in its 2012 judgment in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case, found that Belgium had *ius standi* to claim Senegal’s responsibility for the alleged breach of its obligations under Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture and that such claims were admissible. Also the *erga omnes partes obligation* has been innovated. Details of the points, shown in the judgment, prepared new field to speed up to perform some traditional theories and ideas.

The present paper assesses the Court’s definition and use of the concept of ‘obligations *erga omnes partes*’ in light of public international law. The present paper’s main contentions are three. First, titled "Traditional Doctrines in International Law on Erga Omnes" contains four parts. Totally, traditional theories and backgrounds about this scope would be viewed. The characterisation of obligations in the performance of which all the states parties to a treaty have an ‘interest’ -arguably a ‘common’ one- as ‘obligations *erga omne partes*’ is unnecessary. Secondly, the age after 2012 the judgment of ICJ as titled "New Age" will be analnyzed. Such obligations, as defined, by the Court, remain merely ‘*erga partes*’, binding on the parties to the treaty constituting their source *qua* parties to the treaty and subject, as any other conventional obligation, to the rule *res inter alios acta* and to the rules on reservations, which may prevent an ‘obligation *erga omnes partes*’ from becoming binding on states that have made a reservation to the provision setting out the terms of the obligation and on those accepting such reservations. Thirdly, the legal consequences of the use of the concept give further indication of the redundancy of the concept.

2. Traditional Doctrines in International Law on Erga Omnes

A. Classical International Framework on Erga Omnes

Traditional international has a bilateral performance structure. The power of auto-interpretation (of the Charter and of general *international law*) and auto-determination (of the existence of a breach and the engagement of responsibility) of the State exemplifies itself much more forcefully in bilateral relations than in a multilateral or institutional setting. Rights and obligations under it arise between two specific states. This is even so when they derive from a multilateral treaty. Thus under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations a specific receiving state is obliged to grant diplomatic immunity to the performance against that specific receiving state.

1 - See e.g. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 1996, 595, at 616 (para. 31), where the Court affirmed the erga omnes character of the ‘the obligation each State … to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide’ and then noted that it was ‘not territorially limited.’


compliance with the obligation by the state in breach) and diplomatic and judicial dispute settlement. Not only does the state have standing before the court in such cases, but it may also make legal claims through any venue available. Notwithstanding this, not all obligations today fit in this category, which was peculiar of classical international law. Obligations erga omnes do not share this quality. On the contrary when one State violates them, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to find a directly affected state with legal interest, or legal legitimacy (otherwise known as standing or locus standi) to make claim in this regard. Hence, in traditional view those objectively affected by those breaches (such as individuals whose human rights were violated) were left without remedy.

Recognition of international law itself as a valid corpus of rules has been a gradual process. At a national level, the existence and therefore validity of the law is quite clear. Law is created and enforced by virtue of the power of the State exerted over its citizens (individuals). As has been stated, “[i]n systems of municipal law the concept of formal source [of law] refers to the constitutional machinery of law-making and the status of the rule is established by constitutional law.” For this reason it is considered to be ‘valid.’ However, such a formal structure is absent in the international arena. International law has been described as “one of the possible sets of laws for ordering the world” being based “on the wills of all or many nations.” Largely as a result of its very nature (that is, the fact that it is comprised of many sovereign States co-existing) the international community is characterized by the absence of any defined sovereign or formal structure comparable to that present within national jurisdictions. It is however clear that States have become more and more dependent on each other, a phenomenon perhaps largely attributable to the growing ‘institutionalization’ of the international community. This so-called interdependence requires regulation. Although this is sometimes achieved by way of agreements reached between individual States the lacuna is also filled through the recognition by individual States of a so-called international ‘conscience’ which imposes legal regulation on the actions of States and in doing so ensures international respect for basic social values. Similarly, this is reflected in the so-called

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4 - O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 2011), p. 8. There are in modern analysis two opinions as to the validity of the law: (i) Kelsen was of the opinion that only norms and not facts could be valid, while (ii) other authors stated that there are principles which are valid per se and that thereafter it is possible through the will of States, to create positive law from them. See, ibid. p. 196 and V.F. Olea, Ensayo Sobre La Soberania Del Estado (Universidad nacional de Mexico, 1969), p. 120 respectively.
5 - J. J. Szucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal (Springer-Verlag, 1974), pp. 35, 165. This interdependence of States also means that so-called freedom of action of States (which in any event has never been absolute) is even more curtailed today.
6 - Based on this ‘moral code’ international recognition and respect for certain basic social values can mean that particular agreements reached between a limited number of States become ‘valid’ for all. See C. de Visscher, Théories et Réalités en Droit International Public (Spanish Edition, 1962), pp.151 - 153.
international moral infrastructure which itself is subject to normative disciplines. As a result of the regulation of States by international law, the concept of ‘national sovereignty’ has undergone an evolution and today States are regulated by both their own national rules together with the continually developing laws of the international community. These laws develop or are created not by an international legislator or sovereign, but very generally through the consensus of States which have recognized that certain ‘values’ amount to valid legal norms which must be respected as between States.

Articles 55 and 56 of the charter proclaimed the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms as a programme of the United Nations. By referring in Article 56 to the items of that programme as "purposes", the charter links them to Article 1 which lists the purposes of the organization, and among them, in para 3 the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. Until then international law had been focused on the sovereignty of states and deal with the relations between them. The charter now established the human person a second focal point, proposing to make in the subject of international rights and to impose on states corresponding obligations under international law for the benefit of persons under their jurisdiction. Whether the founders of the United Nations realized that they were profoundly changing the parameters of traditional international law with that programme. Hence it does not come as a surprise that they failed to prescribe the manner in which these new type of obligations should be fitted into the traditional framework of international law. Moreover, by listing the maintenance of international peace and security, sovereignty, justice, and respect for human rights as purposes and putting them on the same footing, without indicating which of them should prevail in case of conflict, the charter laid the foundation of a philosophical debate which is, until today, without issue.

Besides, it is possible to talk of the ‘validity’ of international law. Having recognized the general general validity of international law, before one can identify those norms which may be designated norms of overriding importance within this law, it is necessary to identify the sources from which they may be drawn. The sources of international law are generally regarded as having been exhaustively enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"):

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

A. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

B. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

C. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

-See also, Hauriou who stated that the best way an institution can express itself is not legal but moral and intellectual. F. Hauriou, Aux Sources de Droit, 23 Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée, p. 117.


D. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

It is immediately noteworthy that norms of *jus cogens* are not included specifically as being a ‘formal’ source of international law. Before these norms can be properly placed among the ‘formal’ sources one must identify both its evolution as a legal concept and the extent of international recognition of its existence. The obligation *Erga Omnes* are non-derogable in times of war as well as peace’ and are binding as such on all members of the international community.\(^2\) Thus, recognizing certain international crimes as *jus cogens* carries with it the duty to prosecute or extradite\(^3\) the non-applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes\(^4\) and universality of jurisdiction\(^5\) over such crimes irrespective of where they were committed, by whom (including heads of state), against what category of victims, and irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or war). Above all, the characterization of certain crimes as *jus cogens* places upon states the *obligatio erga omnes* not to grant impunity to the violators of such crimes Positive ICL does not contain such an explicit norm as to the effect of characterizing a certain crime as part of *jus cogens*. Furthermore, the practice of states does not conform to the scholarly writings that espouse these views. The practice of the state’s evidences that, more often than not, impunity has been allowed for *jus cogens* crimes, the theory of universality has been far from being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of specific treaty obligations.\(^5\) In such situation, standard-setting conventions have a different performance structure.\(^7\) They prescribe a conduct which is unrelated to any specific right of the other contracting parties under the convention. That has recognized by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, when it stated:

*In such a convention the contracting states do not have an interest of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison detre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type on cannot speak of*

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individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between the rights and duties.

Thus, a standard-setting convention creates only the right of a contracting party to request fulfillment of its commitments by all other contracting parties. A party does not have substantive rights under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or under Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The obligation of a party to conduct itself in accordance with the prescribed standard exists towards all other contracting parties, and is, therefore, an obligation *erga omnes.* Consequently, in this age, multilateral treaties have been used in other fields for creating general standards of conduct in the achievement of a common purpose. (Which some of them titled as *Erga Omnes Obligations*)

**B. Traditional International Court of Justice Doctrine**

The term *erga omnes* means “flowing to all,” and so obligations deriving from *jus cogens* are presumably *erga omnes.* Indeed, legal logic supports the proposition that what is “compelling law” must necessarily engender an obligation “flowing to all.” The problem with such a simplistic formulation is that it is circular. What “flows to all” is “compelling,” and if what is “compelling” “flows to all,” it is difficult to distinguish between what constitutes a “general principle” creating an obligation so self-evident as to be “compelling” and so “compelling” as to be “flowing to all,” that is, binding on all states. The concept of *erga omnes* appears in international law for the first time in two paragraphs of the judgment in the *Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), Belgium vs. Spain* which the I.C.J. delivered on February 5, 1970. In this case, the ICJ indicated a number of obligations are held as possessing this *erga omnes* character. Those were the obligation outlawing acts of aggression and genocide and the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Relying heavily on the ICJ's statement in the Barcelona Traction case that obligations erga omnes may derive from the 'principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person', Ragazzi focuses on human rights as the most likely source of new obligations. He also considered the law of development and international environmental law, but considers human rights law the “privileged domain for the

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1. ICJ Reports 1951, 15 et seq., (23).
3. In an important study bearing on the *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* relationship, Professor Randall notes that “traditionally international law functionally has distinguished the *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* doctrines.” Randall, supra note 7, at 830. However, he, too, seems to accept the *sine qua non* relatively. *Jus cogens* means compelling law. [The *jus cogens* concept refers to] peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which may therefore operate to invalidate a treaty or *Jus cogens* means compelling law. [The *jus cogens* concept refers to] peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which may therefore operate to invalidate a treaty or agreement between States to the extent of the inconsistency with any such principles or norms. *Id.*
evolution of the concept of obligation Erga Omnes”. On the other hand, the court has been reluctant to acknowledge further obligations erga omnes, as it has been in regard to jus cogens norms.

In an of-cited paragraph, the majority of the judges stated that:

[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The relevant text of the paragraphs 33 and 34 follow:

33. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.

Since 1995 the Court has made several more deliberate pronouncements about obligations erga omnes in cases where the topic had greater direct relevance than it seemingly had in Barcelona Traction. This was a groundbreaking new idea for a count that had rejected any hint of community interest under international law just a few years before. The Barcelona Traction dictum however has been followed up by further references to the erga omnes concept, which to date has been mentioned in no less than eight other proceedings, namely in the orders or judgments in the Namibia, Nuclear Tests, Nicaragua, East Timor, Genocide, Gabcˇi´kovo, Armed Activities (Congo-Rwanda), and Israeli Wall cases. To these, a considerable number of separate and dissenting opinions has to be added. Thus, criterion of an obligation rising to the level of erga omnes is, in the words of the ICJ, “the obligations of a state towards the international Community as a whole.”

1 - K.K. Mwenda, Public International Law and the Regulation of Diplomatic Immunity in the Fight against Corruption (Pretoria University Law Press (PULP), 2011). p.70
2 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case." p.47.
6 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case." p.45.
8 - Id.
While the ICJ goes on to give examples of such obligations in *Barcelona Traction*,\(^1\) it does not define precisely what meaning it attaches to the phrase “obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole.”\(^2\)

The facts of the *Barcelona Traction* Case do not give grounds for a pronouncement as the one that the court made on the *erga omnes* obligations and the impact it produced. This actually is the main basis for criticism and calls for a brief summary of the case and a comprehensive analysis on the significance of the pronouncement. The case arose out of the adjudication in a bankruptcy case by a Spanish court of the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited, a Canadian company. Belgium filed an application seeking reparation for damages sustained by Belgian nationals, shareholders in the company, as a result of acts contrary to international law committed by organs of the Spanish state. The Spanish Government raised four preliminary objections to the application.\(^3\) The court rejected the first and the second objections concerning the jurisdiction of the court and ruled on the merits of the third and the fourth objections. The third objection of the Spanish Government was that the Belgian Government lacked capacity to submit any claim for wrongs done to a Canadian company even if the shareholders were Belgian. On the third preliminary question, the court reasoned that an injury to the shareholder’s interests did not confer rights on the shareholder’s national state to exercise diplomatic protection for the purposes of seeking redress. That right is conferred on the national state of the company alone. No international law rule expressly confers such a right on the shareholder’s national state. The possession by the Belgian Government of a right of protection was a prerequisite for examination, and since no *jus standi* before the Court had been established, it was not for the Court to pronounce upon any other aspect of the case. As seen above, since the Court dealt with Belgium’s right to *jus standi* in seeking compensation for Belgian shareholders, the *erga omnes* obligations pronouncement is not strongly related to the merits of the case.\(^4\) *Erga omnes*, as stated above, however, is a consequence of a given international crime having risen to the level of *jus cogens*.\(^5\) It is not, therefore, a cause of or a condition for a crime’s inclusion in the category of *jus cogens*.

In the second phase of the *South West Africa* cases\(^6\) in 1966, in a very close vote (ultimately decided by the tie-breaking opinion of President Percy Spender), the ICJ explicitly denied the existence of any form of *international action popularis*.\(^7\) The position adopted by the former Government of South Africa on the question of what was once known as *South-West Africa* is the

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\(^1\) *Id.* The court further stated in the ensuing paragraph: Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law (*Reservations to the Convention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951*, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

\(^2\) *Barcelona Traction*, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.


\(^4\) I.C.J. Reports 1996 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro).


\(^7\) INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, (1996;paragraph 88).
most prominent example of this, but not the only one. There lies the dilemma to which the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has pointed, when the drew attention to the difficulty of characterizing precisely in legal terms a situation in which that Government was declining to act on an advisory opinion that “it was not legally bound to accept but which gave expression to the legal position as ascertained by the Court and as accepted by the General Assembly." However, care is needed to overcome the unexpected type of jurisdictional issue that frustrated to south case west of Africa by a clear statement of it into just standi ratione personae and jus standi ratione materia is unsound and unacceptable.2

The contemporary genesis of the concept obligatio erga omnes for jus cogens crimes is found in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.3 The concept also finds support both in the ICJ’s South West Africa cases as well as from the Barcelona Traction4 case. However, it should be noted that the South West Africa cases dealt inter alia with human rights violations and not with international crimes stricto sensu5 and that the Barcelona Traction case concerned an issue of civil law.6 Now it seemed to have adopted a diametrically opposite position, advocating that certain obligations are of such importance for the international community that all States could be deemed to have a legal interest in their protection and coimpliance.7 However, this was not the first time that the ICJ invoked such a concept. In its early days, in the reservations it the genocide Convention advisory opinion, it had also noted that “[…] in such a convention, the contracting states do not vant interess, namely the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d e tre of the convention.”8 The court also added to the roster in the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovin v. Serbia and Montenegro) and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (DRC v. Rwanda) (the obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention are erga omnes), but without further inquiring into the legal effects of such findings.9

After the pronouncement, references to the concept of obligations erga omnes have occurred both in the judgments and advisory opinions rendered by the International Court, some of

1 - Murungu and Biegon, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa.,p.51.
4 - Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); see Christenson, supra note 54.
6 - M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIO ERGA OMNES, BASS2.FMT, 04/03/98, pp.72-74.
7 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case.",p.45.
8 - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,(1951;p.23).
which will also be addressed in the following pages. In his dissenting opinion on the *East Timor* case (where references to *erga omnes* obligations were also made), Judge Weeramantry listed the following cases as those in which the International Court dealt with the question of obligations *erga omnes*: Northern Cameroon, South West Africa, Nuclear Tests, Hostages, and Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras). However, the most important evolution beyond the Barcelona Traction Case was the emergence of the *erga omnes* obligation to respect the right to self-determination in the *East Timor* case and in the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and the *erga omnes* obligation on the prohibition of torture recognized by the ICTY in the Furundzija case. As an aside, the jurisprudence of the ICJ is open to critics in what touches upon obligation *erga omnes*, as it is marred by definitional confusions. Besides the obiter dictum in the *East Timor* case, the court in the Israel Wall advisory opinion also identified as *erga omnes* a number of obligations pertaining to international human rights law and international humanitarian law violated by Israel in the construction of the wall in Palestine, concluding that as a consequence, all states had a duty not to recognize or assist the resulting situation.

In the *East Timor* case, the court dealt with the application of Portugal against Australia, according to which Australia had by its conduct failed to observe the obligation to respect the duties and powers of Portugal as the administering power and the right of the people to self-determination and related rights. The *East Timor Case* In the *East Timor case*, 23 at the core of the Portuguese claim against Australia was the question of validity of the Gap Treaty, 1989 entered into between Australia and Indonesia, on the delamination of the opposite continental shelves, in view of the rights of the people of East Timor under the principle of self-determination and the rights of Portugal as the administering power in respect of East Timor. Relevant to our case is the pronouncement in regard to the right of self-determination. In the Court’s view, the right of peoples to self-determination is irreproachable, since it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, and has an *erga omnes* character. It is significant, it should be noted, that the Court did not say “*erga omnes obligations*” but rather “*erga omnes character*”. However, paragraph 155 of the I.C.J. advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly on the “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory” states that obligations *erga omnes* are the obligation to respect the right to self-determination and certain obligations under international humanitarian law. Obviously, the court expressly states the “*erga omnes obligation*” to respect the right to self-determination and also refers to the *East Timor* case as a source on the same line of reasoning. On the other hand, it did so expressly in

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6. - I.C.J. Reports, 2003 (Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), para.155
7. - I.C.J. Reports , 2003 (Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), paras. 88 & 156.

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this case, in which it said that “the right of peoples to self-determination\(^1\) (...) has an erga omnes character.” \(^2\)

Since the right to self-determination, according to some scholars, is a *jus cogens* norm\(^3\) and since the I.C.J. has clearly referred to it as an *erga omnes* obligation, by drawing an analogy with the other *erga omnes* obligations in the *Barcelona Traction* case deriving from *jus cogens* norms, it is safe to regard the obligation to respect the right to self-determination as an *erga omnes* obligation.\(^4\) Furthermore, in the *Furundžija* case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in paragraph 151 held that:

*Furthermore, the prohibition of torture imposes upon States obligations erga omnes, that is, obligations owed towards all the other members of the international community, each of which then has a correlative right. In addition, the violation of such an obligation simultaneously constitutes a breach of the correlative right of all members of the international community and gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing to each and every member, which then has the right to insist on fulfillment of the obligation or in any case to call for the breach to be discontinued.*

The Trial Chamber in *Furundžija*, held that “any form of captivity vitiates consent.”\(^5\) The Tribunal clearly refers to the prohibition of torture as an *erga omnes* obligation. Furthermore, the prohibition of torture is also frequently referred to as a *jus cogens* norm (a norm of a peremptory character) in international law. Again, by drawing analogy with the obligations specified in the *Barcelona* case, it is safe to add the *erga omnes* obligation of the prohibition of torture to the group of well-established *erga omnes* obligations in international law to date.\(^6\)

This comment, however, only identifies part of the problem. It is difficult to disagree with the factual assessment – as will be shown in subsequent chapters, obligations erga omnes often have yet to enter ‘the world of the “is”’.\(^7\) On the other hand, the observation seems to suggest that, as a matter of law, the *erga omnes* concept was fully developed, and that all that remained to be done was to implement it in practice. If this assessment were correct, further legal analysis would be unnecessary, and should be substituted by political pledges and action. Of course, however, it is not correct.\(^8\) A difficulty with the *erga omnes* concept cannot be reduced to problems of

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\(^1\) Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case.", p.47.


implementation, or differences between is and ought, Sein and Sollen. Despite the wealth of analysis and the host of solemnly-worded statements, commentators continue to disagree about even the most fundamental issues. Having reviewed the ICJ’s jurisprudence, Thirlway doubts whether the Barcelona Traction dictum is ‘little more than an empty gesture’. On the basis of a rather summary reference to international practice, Rubin arrives at the same result. More specifically, there is no agreement about the scope of the erga omnes concept, and the legal consequences flowing from that status remain unclear. A brief glance at the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the many academic works addressing obligations erga omnes shows that the concept has become a sort of legal panacea; it is said to affect the legal regime of law enforcement, but also the pacta tertiis principle, the question of persistent objection, the territorial and temporal application of obligations, etc. Thirty-five years after the Barcelona Traction judgment (and quite apart from problems of implementation), there is thus very often no agreed ought and basic aspects of the legal regime of obligations erga omnes remain ‘very mysterious indeed’. Given these controversies, it may be no coincidence that its implementation has proven tortuous. Of course, the erga omnes concept has been the subject of a number of earlier studies, many of which focus on the decentralized enforcement of obligations erga omnes. In view of the continuing interest in it, and the remaining controversies, a reassessment nevertheless seems justified; this in particular because more recent developments have helped clarify some of the underlying issues. The ICJ and its members have pronounced on specific features of obligations erga omnes in the East Timor, Genocide, Gabcˇí’kovo cases, as well as, most recently, the Israeli Wall case. Consequently, they are usually created by custom, which is universal (even if one can imagine an erga omnes obligation established by a treaty of universal ratification, one wonders if it would not be better seen as an erga omnes obligation). On the other hand, obligation erga omnes partes (as mention below in ILC articles) exist as between certain states only; they are predominantly created by treaty, although it is equally possible for a legal or

1 - Simma’s own work, which discusses many aspects of the legal regime of obligations erga omnes and is frequently referred to in subsequent chapters, testifies to this.
2 -Mwenda, Public International Law and the Regulation of Diplomatic Immunity in the Fight against Corruption.,p.100.
6 - CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law,p4.
7 - Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law.,p.12.
8 - ibid.,p.13.
9 - S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001).,p.56.
10 - See ICJ Reports 1995, 90 (East Timor); 1996, 595 (Genocide); 1997, 7 (Gabcˇí’kovo), and 43 ILM (2004), 1009 (Israeli Wall) respectively. The text of the Israeli Wall opinion is also available at www.icj-cij.org.
non-universal custom to create such obligations.\(^1\) Besides, the general approach of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction and this period has a distinction can be made between Obligation Erga Omnes which seek to protect the interests of other states and obligations erga omnes which seek to protect human beings directly.\(^2\)

**C. International Law Commission Doctrine**

In the three-and-a-half decades that have passed since 5 February 1970, this passage (which will be referred to as the Barcelona Traction dictum) has puzzled courts and commentators, including, at times, the ICJ itself.\(^3\) On its basis, international lawyers have begun to discuss the concept of obligations erga omnes, or obligations owed to the international community as a whole.\(^4\) The importance of this category of obligations, at least from a conceptual point of view, is widely acknowledged today. To answer, the question, what exactly is meant by legal interest in the 1970 obiter dictum, broadly put, legal interest is a necessary condition for any international legal subject to make claims on international plane, as part of the international claims process in the law of international responsibility. The legal rules governing most aspects of international responsibility were codified or progressively developed by the ILC in its 2001 Articles and their accompanying commentary.\(^5\) Perhaps more importantly, as has been stated already, the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, completed in 2001, recognize the pivotal role of the erga omnes concept.\(^6\) Part Three Three of the ILC’s text constitutes the most comprehensive attempt to date to spell out the legal consequences flowing from erga omnes breaches and to define the position of States affected by such breaches.\(^7\) The present study will take into account these more recent developments, which so far have hardly been discussed in detail.\(^8\)

It is brought out with particular clarity in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, adopted in 2001, which recognize its impact on the rules governing the

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1 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case."., p.47.
4 - Although not identical in meaning, both expressions are generally treated as synonyms. The present study employs the former expression, as it is the more common. For a different approach see e.g. article 48 (1)(b) ASR and para. 9 of the ILC’s commentary.
5 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case.", p.46.
8 - Cf., however, the study by Empell (2003), published after the completion of the Articles on State Responsibility. For general assessments of the ILC’s work see Crawford (2002a); Dupuy (2003), 305; Dupuy (2002b), 354–398; Tams (2002a), 759; as well as the various contributions to symposia organised by the American Society of International Law and the European University Institute, published in 96 AJIL (2002), 773–889; 13 EJIL (2002), 1053–1255, respectively.
invocation of responsibility,\textsuperscript{1} and expressly cite Para 33 of the Barcelona Traction judgment as evidence of a modern approach, pursuant to which State responsibility can no longer be reduced to bilateral relations between pairs of States.\textsuperscript{2} Many commentators are prepared to go beyond that. To them, the emergence of obligations erga omnes marks no less than a paradigm shift in international law. Delbrück sees it as part of ‘the ongoing process of the constitutionalization of international law’:\textsuperscript{3} to many others, obligations erga omnes (together with the related concept of peremptory norms) reflect ‘a common core of norms essential for the protection of communal values and interests’, which transcend the bilateralism and parochial State concerns dominating traditional international law.\textsuperscript{4} The Latin phrase ‘erga omnes’ thus has become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order based on law.\textsuperscript{5} Indeed, such is the degree of fascination that even sceptical commentators like Prosper Weil (whose earlier work is widely regarded as a highly influential critique) acknowledge that the concept is one of the ‘pie`ces maiˆtres de l”arsenal conceptual du droit international d”aujord’hui’.\textsuperscript{6} As often, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. One problem is readily admitted by commentators: whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.\textsuperscript{7} The international community’s failure effectively to react against humanitarian catastrophes, for example in Pol Pot’s Cambodia or during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, makes solemn proclamations of a core of fundamental values ring hollow.\textsuperscript{10} Bruno Simma’s much-quoted observation encapsulates this feeling of disappointment: ‘Viewed realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is still the world of the ‘‘ought’’ rather than of the ‘‘is’’.\textsuperscript{8}

The first concerns our understanding of the term ‘international responsibility’. As will become clear from the subsequent assessment, erga omnes do not alter the fundamentals of that regime. They modify relevant aspects, and occasionally do so in important ways; yet they operate within the parameters of the regime of international responsibility shaped by the work of the International Law Commission, international practice and jurisprudence. In other words, neither concept affects the three basic propositions upon which the contemporary doctrine of responsibility rests: namely that

\textsuperscript{1} - See article 48 (1)(b) ASR and paras. 2, 8–10 of the ILC’s commentary to that provision. See further para. 2 of the introductory commentary to Part Three, Chapter I, and para. 2–3 and 7 of the introductory commentary to Part Two, Chapter III.
\textsuperscript{2} - See commentary to article 1 ASR, para. 4.
\textsuperscript{3} -Molecular Models of Life: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology, (MIT Press)., 35.
\textsuperscript{4} - See ILA Study Group (2000), para. 105. For similar statements or approaches see e.g. Ragazzi (1997) (stressing the moral foundations of the erga omnes concept and its relevance for the quest ‘for peace and justice among States through the promotion of their common good’ (218)); Tomuschat (1995), 15; Fassbender (1998), 75–85 and 126–128; Fassbender (2003), 5–7; Karl (2002), 277.
\textsuperscript{7} - Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law.,pp. 3-4
\textsuperscript{8} -See also Zemanek, John Fletchall (1800-1884): A Tribute to His Birth 200 Years Ago.,p.10 (‘The Tortuous Implementation of the Idea in Practice’).
(i) responsibility of States and international organizations (such as the EU) under international law is ‘breach-based’, i.e. triggered by attributable conduct violating international obligations; \(^1\) (ii) that it is ‘objective’, i.e. not generally dependent on damage, or fault; \(^2\) and (iii) that it gives rise to ensuing duties of cessation and reparation (plus, exceptionally, a duty to provide for guarantees and assurances of non-repetition). \(^3\) What is more, the three effects assessed in the following have no direct impact on what seems to be – and certainly from the EU’s perspective – the most controversial aspect of the 2011 Draft Articles, namely the delimitation between State and organizational responsibility in the context of joint activity. \(^5\)

It is within the basic parameters of the contemporary responsibility doctrine – as laid down in the ILC’s texts of 2001 and 2011 – that the concepts of *jus cogens* and *erga omnes* entail modifications. Put differently, they might be said to ‘fine-tune’ the application of international responsibility in instances involving particularly grave breaches of international law. The subsequent sections will assess three such instances of fine-tuning by inquiring whether they widen the potential for ‘public interest enforcement’ by the European Union (and other actors), they impose upon the EU and other actors a special regime of aggravated responsibility that would be triggered by breaches of fundamental interest obligations, and they affect the principles of international immunity that have long been perceived as obstacles to the invocation of responsibility. It should nevertheless be noted at the outset that, important though it is, the ILC’s text has not settled matters. There is little doubt that the Commission’s work has shaped, and continues to shape, the modern law of State responsibility. \(^6\) It has brought about an objective understanding, pursuant to which a State incurs responsibility whenever it fails to comply with its international obligations, irrespective of factors such as damage or fault, thus freeing the law of responsibility from fruitless doctrinal controversies about the definition of damage and fault, and the restrictive focus on the reparation of material wrongs. \(^7\)

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\(^{1}\) See Article 2 ASR and Article 4 DARIO. For comment on alternative approaches – e.g. explored under WTO law or in the field of liability – see C. Tams, ‘Unity and Diversity in the Law of State Responsibility’, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Unity and Diversity in International Law* (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 437, at 443-445.

\(^{2}\) Article 2 ARS and Article 4 DARIO. For brief comment see para. 9-10 of the ILC’s commentary to Article 2, in YbILC 2001, vol. II, at 36.

\(^{3}\) Article 30, 31 ARS and Article 30, 31 DARIO.


\(^{5}\) Cf. Part Five DARIO, notably Article 62. For details see note to editors: pls add cross-references to other chapters of the book.

\(^{6}\) Tams, *Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law*, p. 13


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The Commission’s work will not be treated as ‘the law’. The Commission is not (and does not claim to be) infallible. Unless States should decide to conclude a Convention on State Responsibility, its text is not an independent source of the law, but is influential if, and to the extent that, it reflects international practice and jurisprudence. Whether it does needs to be assessed, and commentators seeking to do so are more than glossators explaining the meaning of legal rules. In the light of these considerations, the present study intends to be more than a guide to the ILC’s work. Where relevant – for example in the sections addressing countermeasures – the Commission’s work will be duly taken into account. However, its evaluation cannot replace the assessment of international jurisprudence and practice relating to obligations erga omnes.

More specifically as regards the question of so-called ‘collective’ countermeasures, i.e. countermeasures adopted by states not individually injured by a serious breach of international law, the text adopted on second reading in 2001 is every bit as ambiguous as the first version of 1996. The latter was far from being clear on this point. Certainly, Article 40(3) stipulated that, if the internationally wrongful act constituted an international crime, the expression ‘injured State’ would designate ‘all other States’. However, between acceptance of the idea that every state was injured by an international crime and recognition of the entitlement of any state to respond with countermeasures, there was a step that certain ILC members were not ready to take. Articles 51–53, concerning the specific consequences of ‘international crimes’, were no more explicit. To be sure, Article 51 stated that ‘[a]n international crime entails all the legal consequences of any other internationally wrongful act and, in addition, such further consequences as are set out in Articles 52 and 53’. One might accordingly deduce that, since the countermeasures constituted a legal consequence of the ‘delicts’, Article 51 a fortiori recognized the power of any state ‘injured’ by a crime to have recourse to countermeasures. The commentary to Article 51, however, carefully avoided referring to countermeasures. Similar observations apply mutatis mutandis to Article 53, which stated that ‘[a]n international crime committed by a State entails an obligation for every other State: .. (d) to cooperate with other States in the application of measures designed to eliminate the consequences of the crime’. The very brief commentary to this provision referred in particular to the cooperation of states in implementing sanctions adopted by the Security Council. It added, however, that, ‘apart from any collective response of States through the organized international To what form of ‘minimum response’ was the ILC alluding? One might think of protests, diplomatic pressure and retorsions, but also of countermeasures. It should also be recalled that countermeasures are analyzed as legal entitlements, not obligations. But Article 53 laid down ‘obligations’ of states, not mere

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1 - Although this question is still under consideration, it seems unlikely that States should convene a conference on State responsibility with a view to concluding a treaty. In its Report to the General Assembly, the ILC had proposed that the Assembly should ‘take note’ of the ILC’s text. This it has done in GA Res. 56/83 and again in GA Res. 59/35. For a brief summary of the debate cf. N. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).pp. 58–60.

2 - See below, Chapter 6. While elaborating a regime of countermeasures, the Commission did not have a mandate to define the conditions governing the making of claims before international judicial bodies, such as the ICJ. These depend on the constitutional documents of the relevant institution, as interpreted in the institution’s subsequent jurisprudence.

3 - Tams, *Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law*.p.14

4 - ILC Report, supra note 2, at 165 et seq
entitlements. In short, the whole set of relevant provisions in the version of the Draft adopted in 1996 contained allusions that might, as the case required, be interpreted as allowing the adoption of countermeasures by states not individually affected by a ‘crime’, while remaining evasive, and in the final analysis inconclusive, on the point.\(^1\) Community, the Commission believes that a certain minimum response to a crime is called for on the part of all States\(^2\).

The various sorts of obligations erga omnes partes must also be distinguished from obligations erga omnes. At first sight this distinction seems clear: the former are owed to a group of states parties to a specific legal regime such as a regional convention for the protection of human rights. The latter are by contrast owed to the international community as a whole. It may, however, be that there is an overlap between these two categories of obligations to the extent that the regional instrument takes up an obligation under general international law owed to the international community as a whole. In such an eventuality — frequent particularly in the area of human rights — the states parties to the regional instrument can assert the legal consequences that result from it, as well as (where appropriate) the consequences in general international law. The other states in the international community for their part will invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state and the consequences provided by general international law. It is thus important to stress that the distinction between obligations erga omnes partes and obligations erga omnes, while clear in abstracto, may become blurred in concreto, in the sense that obligations with the same content may simultaneously come within both categories.

We must now consider the ILC’s approach, which consists of identifying with each other, or nearly so, obligations erga omnes and obligations arising from peremptory norms. According to the commentary:

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\text{The examples which the International Court has given of obligations towards the international community as a whole all concern obligations which, it is generally accepted, arise under peremptory norms of general international law. Likewise the examples of peremptory norms given by the Commission in its commentary to what became article 53 of the Vienna Convention involve obligations to the international community as a whole.}^3
\]

In other words, obligations erga omnes and obligations resulting from peremptory norms would be two faces of the same coin. The only distinction between these two categories of obligations would be a ‘difference in emphasis’:

\[
\text{While peremptory norms of general international law focus on the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the focus of obligations to the international community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all States in compliance — i.e. . . . in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach.}^4
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Hence the reference to ‘serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law’ in the chapter concerning the specific consequences of these breaches, and the use

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2. Ibid, at 170.
3. UN Doc. A/56/10, Introduction to the Commentary on Articles 40 and 41, 281, para. 7.
4. Ibid.
The Innovation in Concept of the Erga-Omnisation of … Hossein Sartipi & Ali Reza Hojatzadeh

of the notion of ‘obligations owed to the international community as a whole’ in Article 48, devoted to the ‘invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State’.

By way of illustration of the problem, in the celebrated passage in the Barcelona Traction judgment, the ICJ noted that obligations erga omnes result inter alia ‘from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’. The word ‘including’ clearly suggests there are several other principles and rules relating to human rights that give rise to obligations erga omnes. It is, moreover, significant that the Institute of International Law has not hesitated to generalize the ICJ’s dictum by stating without further ado that the international obligation of states to ensure the observance of human rights, ‘as expressed by the International Court of Justice, is erga omnes’. Yet the obligation in question is much broader than the obligations resulting from norms of jus cogens in the area of human rights. These chiefly concern the irreducible core of human rights, that is, those rights which are non-derogable even ‘in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. Obligations erga omnes and those resulting from peremptory norms form two concentric circles, the first of which is larger than the second. Trying to identify them is a problematic approach which blurs the conceptual clarity of the whole system of ‘serious’ breaches of international law. Thus the preferred text is that presented in the ILC’s report for 2000, which refers only to obligations erga omnes.

Consequently, the ILC foresaw the right to reparation of the invoking third state. Such reparation could only be claimed on behalf and in the interest state. The ILC admitted that this specific aspect involved a measure of progressive development, and this status as custom is doubtful. The ILC divided the obligations erga omnes into two different categories: (general) obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. The former are those obligations in the strict sense put forward by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, creating a legal interest for the whole international community in their compliance.

The classification in question could have been more refined had the distinction between interdependent obligations and those protecting extra-state interests been more clearly established, on the one hand, and had obligations deriving from peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes not been essentially equated. Despite these ambiguities, the classification of international obligations elaborated by the ILC makes much more comprehensible the gradual enlargement of the circle of states affected by a breach, while at the same time enabling the legal position of states individually

Sicilianos, "The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility."
p. 1137
2 - ICJ Reports (1970) 3, at para. 34.
4 - In the terms of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
5 - Sicilianos, "The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility."
p. 1137.
6 - INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, (2001b; commentary to Article 48, paragraph 12).
7 - Kamiyama, "Obligations Erga Omnes and International Public Order after the Decision in the Belgium V. Senegal Case."
p.55.
8 - ibid.,p.47.
injured or not to be distinguished. It is nonetheless the case that the provisions governing the regime of ‘serious’ breaches of international law continue to present certain ambivalences, especially as regards ‘collective’ countermeasures.1

D. Erga Omnes in International Criminal Law Doctrine

International law has dealt with both concepts erga omnes and jus cogens, but mostly in contexts that do not include International Criminal Law (“ICL”).2 The national criminal law of the world’s major legal systems and ICL doctrine have, however scantly, dealt with each of the two concepts.3

1 - Sicilianos, “The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility.”, p. 1145
Furthermore, the positions of publicists and panelists on this question diverge significantly. The main divisions concern how a given international crime achieves the status of *jus cogens* and the manner in which such crimes satisfy the requirements of the “principles of legality.”¹ Under international law, states have an *erga omnes* obligation—in other words a duty owed to the whole *international* community—to investigate and prosecute *crimes* against humanity, genocide and torture even if this means that amnesty laws are in effect annulled. This means that, for example, Sierra Leone has an obligation under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes against humanity and torture, irrespective of the *Lome Amnesty* and the setting up of the SCSL. Other states also have an obligation to prosecute these crimes based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. Crimes committed in the *post-Lome* period fall outside the amnesty and can be prosecuted under domestic law.²

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It is still uncertain in ICL whether the inclusion of a crime in the category of *jus cogens* creates rights or, as stated above, non-derogable duties *erga omnes*. These *erga omnes* duties are legally enforceable, at least in theory, are non-derogable and are binding as such on all members of the international community. The establishment of a permanent international criminal court having inherent jurisdiction over these crimes would be a convincing argument for the proposition that crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are part of *jus cogens* and that obligations *erga omnes* to prosecute or extradite flow from them. For instance, the norm against torture, moreover, is undoubtedly one of the “basic rights of the human person” that partake of an *erga omnes* character, that is, it is one in which all states have a legal interest in ensuring its protection. In addition, the Security Council referred the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the *International Criminal Court* (ICC), urging even no-State parties to the ICC to cooperate fully with the Court. Arguably, in these circumstances, all States would be under an obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Article 41 of the Articles on States Responsibility. Responsibility to protect (RtoP) at least asserts moral pressure an States, all of whom are affected by a serious breach of a peremptory norms in view of its *erga omnes* character, to take any necessary lawful measures to to induce a State to comply with its obligation of cessation.

With respect to the consequences of recognizing an international crime as *jus cogens*, the threshold question is whether such a status places obligations *erga omnes* upon states or merely gives them certain rights to proceed against perpetrators of such crimes. The obligation to prosecute and punish international crime once a crime has been identified as having *jus cogens* status, it inevitably imposes obligations *erga omnes*, or obligations owed to all mankind. This threshold question of whether *obligatio erga omnes* carries with it the full implications of the Latin word *obligatio*, or whether it is denatured in international law to signify only the existence of a right rather than a binding legal obligation, has neither been resolved in international law nor addressed by ICL doctrine. To this writer, the implications of *jus cogens* are those of a duty and not of optional rights; otherwise *jus cogens* would not constitute a peremptory norm of international law. Consequently, these obligations are non-derogable in times of war as well as peace. Thus, recognizing certain international crimes as *jus cogens & erga omnes* carries with it the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and

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8. See Bassiouni and Wise, *Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law*. 

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universality of jurisdiction\(^2\) over such crimes irrespective of where they were committed, by whom (including Heads of State), against what category of victims, and irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or war). Above all, the characterization of certain crimes as *jus cogens* places upon states the *obligatio erga omnes* not to grant impunity to the violators of such crimes.\(^3\) Many of the most serious human rights violations, including most acts that breach “elementary considerations of humanity”, would also constitute a criminal offence under national criminal law. International criminal law plays a role when the acts committed are particularly grave. Some acts are so heinous that they amount to a crime under international law; regardless of whether they are also criminalized in particular countries.\(^4\)

Positive ICL does not contain such an explicit norm as to the effect of characterizing a certain crime as part of *jus cogens* & *erga omnes*. Furthermore, the practice of states does not conform to the scholarly writings that espouse these views. The practice of the state’s evidences that, more often than not, impunity has been allowed for *jus cogens* or *erga omnes* crimes, the theory of universality has been far from being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of specific treaty obligations. There is also much question as to whether the duty to prosecute or extradite is in the disjunctive or in the


\(^2\) See Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives.


conjunctive, which of the two has priority over the other and under what circumstances, and, finally, whether implicit conditions of effectiveness and fairness exist with respect to the duty to prosecute and with respect to extradition leading to prosecution.  

The gap between legal expectations and legal reality is therefore quite wide. It may be bridged by certain international pronouncements and scholarly writings, but the question remains whether such a bridge can be solid enough to allow for the passage of these concepts from a desideratum to enforceable legal obligations under ICL, creating state responsibility in case of non-compliance. It is still uncertain in ICL whether the inclusion of a crime in the category of jus cogens creates rights or, as stated above, non-derogable duties erga omnes. The establishment of a permanent international criminal court having inherent jurisdiction over these crimes would be a convincing argument for the proposition that crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are part of jus cogens and that obligations erga omnes to prosecute or extradite flow from them.

As a result, there are both gaps and weaknesses in the various sources of ICL norms and enforcement modalities. The work of the ILC in formulating the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes is insufficient. A comprehensive international codification would obviate these problems, but this is not forthcoming. Existing state practices are also few and far between and are insufficient to establish a solid legal basis to argue that the obligations deriving from jus cogens and erga omnes crimes are in fact carried out as established by law, or at least as perceived in the writings of progressive jurists. Thus, it is important to motivate governments to incorporate the obligations described into their national laws as well as to urge their expanded use in the practice of states. Jurists have, therefore, an important task in advancing the application of these ICL norms, which are an indispensable element in the protection of human rights and in the preservation of peace.

Moreover, the designation of international crimes and obligations erga omnes does not involve a purported new source of law: crimes are created and defined through the conclusion of treaties; obligations erga omnes through treaty and customary international law. Secondly, it appears logical that all international crimes are obligations erga omnes because the international community as a whole identifies and may prosecute and punish the commission of such crimes. The reverse is not the case, however. Not all obligations erga omnes have been designated as international crimes. Racial discrimination, for example, is cited as an obligation erga omnes, but is not included among international crimes except in its most extreme forms (genocide and apartheid). Among those acts

1 - See Bassiouni and Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law.
4 - See I. Brownlie, State Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1983).
designated as international crimes, there appears to be no hierarchy.\textsuperscript{1} As a conclusion, at least fundamental human rights such as the rights to life, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, freedom from slavery and racial discrimination, and freedom from retroactive application of criminal law are non-derogable and recognized by the international community as a hole. The \textit{erga omnes} character of those norms can hardly be contrasted. Breaches of these obligations are viewed as gross violations of human rights rendering the on a case-by-case basis. Once it is established that there is an overwhelming opinion \textit{juris} that all states are legally bound by the norm in question, it can be treated as having an \textit{erga omnes} character.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{E. Fundamental Interest obligations Doctrine}

Another preliminary remark is in the form of a caveat. For reasons of convenience, the subsequent sections treat \textit{jus cogens} and \textit{erga omnes} as sub-categories of a broader notion of norms protecting ‘fundamental interest of the international community’, which we will refer to as ‘fundamental interest obligations (\textit{fundamental interests of the international community} must be "strengthened" more than others)\textsuperscript{3} In treating them as part of a broader notion, we acknowledge the close nexus between the two concepts, which since the late 1960s, have largely developed ‘in tandem’ and which both describe categories of particularly important values.\textsuperscript{4} Given the increasing prominence of attempts to merge obligations \textit{erga omnes} and \textit{jus cogens} into a joint category, we would however stress at the outset that there are sound reasons, both conceptual and pragmatic, to maintain the distinction between obligations \textit{erga omnes} and norms of \textit{jus cogens}. Notably, whereas \textit{jus cogens} norms are characterized by their elevated hierarchical status, obligations \textit{erga omnes} can well operate on an ‘ordinary’ hierarchical level. (A norm to a hierarchically superior level remains controversial)\textsuperscript{5} Whereas \textit{jus cogens} status affects the validity of conflicting norms, \textit{erga omnes} status affects the position of third States vis-à-vis the obligation.(not necessarily the parent State)\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Jus cogens} and obligations \textit{erga omnes} – at least in their current ‘incarnation’ (A norm could be erga omnes in the sense that any state could invoke its breach, and yet it not separately constitute a crime; however, few crimes will not simultaneously incarnate \textit{erga omnes} obligations)\textsuperscript{7}– thus may have entered the international legal discourse almost simultaneously, but follow different rationales. On that basis, they should not be merged; and decision to deal with them ‘en bloc’ in the following sections should not be read as an attempt to support such a reading.

The obvious impact concerns the legal rules governing the implementation of international responsibility. In essence, international law permits States and international organizations to invoke the responsibility of another State or international organization for breaches of fundamental interest

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} D.L. Shelton, \textit{Advanced Introduction to International Human Rights Law} (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2014),p.89.
\item \textsuperscript{2} J. Petman and M. Koskenniemi, \textit{Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 1999} (BRILL, 2002),p.199.
\item \textsuperscript{5} K. Ambos and O.A. Maunganidze, \textit{Pouvoir Et Poursuite} (Univ.-Verlag, 2012),p.190.
\end{itemize}
obligations even if they themselves have not been specially affected by the breach. Their entitlement should be admitted because an action on their part can contribute to enhance the protection of fundamental interests of the international community. This is the key aspect of the erga omnes concept, which following the Barcelona Traction case, has been understood primarily as a law enforcement concept permitting States to respond against breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Within the framework of international responsibility, this impact concerns the ‘enforceability’ of international law – rather than the conditions under which responsibility is incurred, or the consequences of responsibility. In 2001, the International Law Commission sought to ‘operationalize’ the erga omnes concept in Part Three of its Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARS’), notably Articles 42, 48 and 54. The 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations adapt these provisions with only minor modifications in Articles 43, 49, and 57. The Commission has since begun a separate consideration of the topic Responsibility of international organizations.

On the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality. Thus it offers little clarity on the issue of possible reactions by third states to the violation of such erga omnes obligations, the enforceability of which all states have a legal interest in.

Notwithstanding the ILC’s work, the idea that international law should accept, within narrow boundaries, some form of ‘public interest enforcement’ continues to meet with occasional resistance. Perhaps this resistance is best explained as a ‘rearguard action’ by States and commentators clinging to the fiction of a system of international law based on synallagmatic pairs of reciprocal rights and duties running between pairs of States – or States and international organizations, for that matter. However, such rearguard actions belie the fact that international law has moved on to embrace multilateralism and global public interests: “community interest is permeating the body of international law much more thoroughly than ever before”, and the ILC’s attempt, in its work on responsibility, to spell out a regime of public interest enforcement reflects that fact.

At least with respect to measures taken against States, practice suggests a more liberal approach. Since 1970, States and international organizations have taken countermeasures in response to grave and systematic breaches of fundamental interest obligations in a surprisingly large number of instances. They have not usually made express reference to the erga omnes character of the breach in question; but by and large seem to have responded against breaches of obligations that (like those

4 - The ILC made the point very clearly when in para. 4 of its commentary to Article 1 ARS, it cited the ICJ’s Barcelona Traction dictum on obligations erga omnes, and went on to note: “The consequences of a broader conception of international responsibility must necessarily be reflected in the articles which, although they include standard bilateral situations of responsibility, are not limited to them.” (Yearbook ILC 2001, vol. II, at p. 33).
protecting fundamental human rights or outlawing the use of force) are generally considered to be owed to the internationally community as a whole. In most instances, these assertions of a right to defend public interests of the international community have involved coercion of a limited degree – typically breaches of bilateral treaties of limited relevance; often political symbolism rather than actual pressure of relevance. Still, international practice – to be illustrated below – suggests that, when seeking to respond against grave breaches of fundamental interest obligations, States and international organizations have been prepared to act as ‘guardians’ of community values and in that context asserted a right to violate international law in order to ‘induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international law’.

At a functional level, obligation erga omnes play a potentially significant role in relaxing the restrictive rules of standing before international tribunals, given the interest of all States in ensuring compliance. Brinie and Boyle suggest that the significance of erga omnes obligations goes further still, providing a normative framework and method for international community to hold individual States accountable before the institutions created by treaty regimes. The codification of the rules governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts was one of the first topics on the agenda of the ILC when it commenced its work in 1948. A hierarchical system of legal obligation has been introduced into international law under the cover of jus cogens (fundamental rules of customary international law that cannot be set aside by treaty) and obligations erga omnes (which are owed all States and all States have a legal interest in their protection). This is reflected in the rules on State responsibility and the rules being drafted on the responsibility of international organizations. Responsibility in this context is a mechanism by which States and international organizations may be called to account for breaches of the substantive rules on international law. The goal is to provide a “reparative response” so that the international legal order which has been upset by the breach can be restored.

3. Erga Omnes in Modern Age

The International Court of Justice, in its 2012 judgment in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case, found that Belgium had ius standi to claim Senegal’s responsibility for the alleged breach of its obligations under Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture and that such claims were admissible. Also, it concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether Belgium was ‘specially affected’ or ‘injured’. The Court based these findings on the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, which it defined as obligations in the compliance of which states have an ‘interest’, which, in the case of the above provisions is a ‘common interest’. Several members of the Court rejected the above findings as inconsistent with the law of international responsibility, and state practice and, for other reasons, ill-grounded. The concept of a duty erga omnes inter partes, or a duty owed to all parties to a treaty, was first announced by the ICJ in 1970 as part of some obiter dicta about the nature of international obligations. This is the idea that all States have a “legal interest” in compliance with norm in question. The exact nature of that legal interest remained undefined as the case did not involve an

1 - The following draws heavily on Tams (note 1), 198-251.
3 Hoffmann, Nollkaemper, and Swerissen, Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice., pp.126-7
application of the rule. It remained an open question whether or not a State needed to be somehow specifically interested in the alleged breach of the international norm to have standing to bring an action before the ICJ.

The Cort heard arguments from March 12 to 21, 2012 in “Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)” over the fate of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré. Habré is accused of responsibility for thousands of political killings and systematic torture when he ruled Chad, from 1982 to 1990, before fleeing to Senegal. Seven of Habré’s victims filed a criminal complaint in Senegal in January 2000, accusing him of torture, barbaric acts, and crimes against humanity. A Senegalese judge indicted Habré on those charges but, after political interference by the Senegalese government, which was denounced by two UN human rights rapporteurs, appellate courts dismissed the case on the grounds that Senegalese courts lacked jurisdiction to try crimes committed abroad. Other victims, including three Belgian citizens, then filed a case in Belgium. In September 2005, after four years of investigation, a Belgian judge indicted Habré and Belgium requested his extradition. A Senegalese court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the extradition request, and the Senegalese government referred the Habré case to the African Union (AU) for a decision on how Habré should be tried. The AU created a Committee of Eminent African Jurists and, on its recommendation, asked Senegal in July 2006 to prosecute Habré “on behalf of Africa.” Senegal accepted the AU mandate and amended its legislation to give its courts extraterritorial jurisdiction over international crimes but for years raised obstacle after obstacle to Habré’s trial. Belgium filed an application against Senegal at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February 2009 after Senegal failed to extradite Habré and continued to stall on his trial. Belgium has submitted three subsequent extradition requests. Two were rejected on technical grounds as the Senegalese government apparently did not transmit the Belgian legal papers intact to the court, and the third is still pending. In 2011 Senegal announced and then retracted a decision to expel Habré back to Chad.

The Judgment in the case concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) is the first in the history of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in which it found that a State had standing based on obligations erga omnes partes. Before that, the PCIJ had only once to pronounce on this question in the 1928 Wimbledon case. In para. 68 of its judgment the Court stated, inter alia, that:

The States parties to the Convention have a common interest to ensure, in view of their shared values, that acts of torture are prevented and that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity. The obligations of a State party to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the facts and to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution are triggered by the presence of the alleged offender in its territory, regardless of the nationality of the offender or the victims, or of the place where the alleged offences occurred. All the other States parties have a common interest in compliance with these obligations by the State in whose territory the alleged offender is present. That common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties to the Convention. All the States parties “have a legal interest” in the protection of the rights involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33). These obligations may be defined as “obligations erga omnes partes” in the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case.
The Court’s reference in the judgment to the Barcelona Traction case may create confusion as to the difference between obligations *erga omnes partes* (Article 48(1)(a) of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)) “owed to a group” of States and *erga omnes* obligations (per se) which are “owed to the international community as a whole” (Article 48(1)(b)). The ARSIWA Commentary clarifies that the name “owed to the international community as a whole” was preferred over *erga omnes* in order to avoid confusion “with obligations owed to all the parties to a treaty.” The better view seems, therefore, to be that obligations *erga omnes partes* exist in the case of treaties such as the CAT or the Genocide convention, while obligations *erga omnes* form part of customary law. Article 48 ARSIWA represents progressive development, but the Court in East Timor did not rule out standing deriving from obligations *erga omnes* either. It merely stated that “the *erga omnes* character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things.” (para. 29) In that case the Court lacked jurisdiction based on the Monetary Gold principle. It remains to be seen whether *erga omnes* skeptics are to be proven right or wrong. The Belgium v. Senegal case is interesting also in that the Court decided to deal with the question of Belgium’s standing under the heading of admissibility. The problem with this approach is that the Court may act *proprio motu* on issues relating to its jurisdiction (Article 36(6) of its Statute). On the other hand, issues of *admissibility* (such as the exhaustion of local remedies, nationality of claims, etc.) cannot be dealt with *proprio motu* but depend on an objection being raised by the party concerned. The importance of *jus standi* is such that it must fall for consideration *sua sponte*. (Matscher, F., *Standing before International Courts and Tribunals* in Bernhardt (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (1981) p. 195). Paragraph 68 of Belgium v. Senegal must be contrasted with paragraph 91 of the Barcelona Traction case, holding that “the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality.” Obviously, *erga omnes partes* obligations will not always operate to provide any State party with standing. In the case under comment, Belgium based its claims not only on its status as a party to the CAT, but primarily on its “special interest” which distinguished it from the other parties. By finding that is had standing as a State party, the Court disposed of the need to deal with Belgium’s “special interest” which, as noted by Judge Skotnikov in his Separate opinion, “allows it to avoid dealing… with the question as to whether Belgium has established its jurisdiction in respect of Mr. Habré in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention.”

Judge ad hoc Sur terms the Court’s finding of standing *erga omnes partes* “a rabbit out of a magic hat” since the CAT permits reservations which are, in principle, impermissible in respect of obligations *erga omnes partes* (Argument from *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24) and secondly, the mechanism established in Article 22 CAT is optional. It could be maintained that had the drafters of the CAT intended to entitle any State Party to ensure compliance with the Convention, this mechanism should have been mandatory. Some would say that standing as a mere party may lead to “total judicial chaos” (to borrow the phrase from President Guillaume’s Separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case.) Despite such criticism and with a view to the object and purpose of the CAT, the Judgment has much to commend itself. The reason is best expressed in paragraph 69: “The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim.” Notably, paragraph 120 of the Judgment adds that “the State in whose territory
the suspect is present does indeed have the option of extraditing him to a country which has made such a request, but on the condition that it is to a State which has jurisdiction in some capacity, pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, to prosecute and try him” thus leaving open the question whether Belgium is such a State. For instance, Belgium may have asserted jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle, however its nationality was only subsequently conferred, and only 1 of the 18 complainants of Chadian origin had Belgian nationality.

This case put the question to rest by finding that an obligation erga omnes grants standing to any State that is a party to the instrument in question. The Court held:

The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim. It follows that any State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an end. […]

As a consequence, there is no need for the Court to pronounce on whether Belgium also has a special interest with respect to Senegal’s compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention in the case of Mr. Habré.

Therefore, in case Senegal opts to extradite Mr. Habré it remains questionable whether Belgium is a State “which has jurisdiction… pursuant to Article 5” and, consequently, whether Senegal is obliged to extradite him to Belgium. Erga omnes partes standing also has bearing on the issue of remedies, since a “State other than an injured State” (to use the language of Article 48 ARSIWA) may claim reparation only in the interest of the injured State. One might thus question whether the Court’s judgment in fact resolved the entire dispute between the two parties. As a result, In the above judgment, the Court found, in essence, that: (a) a party to a treaty creating obligations in the compliance of which all the parties to the treaty have a ‘common interest’, which are characterised as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, has standing for the purposes of bringing claims arising out of the breach of such obligations, including, most prominently, an entitlement to invoke international responsibility; and (b) such claims are admissible, even in the absence of a special interest on the part of the party bringing the claim, which the Court needs not determine.1

Obligations erga omnes (partes) are transforming an otherwise bilateral(isable) international legal order, which has traditionally been based on reciprocity2 and individualism, into something much more close to the idea of a community, wherein all states are entitled – but not obliged – to protect what constitutes interests and values that are common to everyone. They have entered positive international law in a rather unexpected way, through a revolutionary obiter dictum by the

1 - Diego Germán Mejía-Lemos, A Commentar y on the Judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v senegal case), National University of Singapore, Singapur, 2014,p.182.
2 - On reciprocity see the very pertinent contribution by A. Paulus, ‘Whether Universal Values can Prevail over Bilateralism and Reciprocity’, in Cassese (ed.) supra n. 2, at 91 et seq.

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ICJ;\(^1\) yet, \textit{erga omnes} came to stay. They found their place in the law of international responsibility and, as a result, all states, even if not directly\(^3\) affected by wrongfulness, are entitled to react against it and invoke the responsibility of the offender.\(^2\) This is how a system moves beyond reciprocity and merely synallagmatic relationships\(^3\) and recognizes the legitimate interest, translated into a proper legal right that each and every state has to be actively engaged in the protection of collective interests. A traditionally sovereigns legal order based upon the premises of reciprocity and self-protection\(^4\) allows its community to protect its shared interests and values in a collective way. This is the reality of obligations \textit{erga omnes} – or this is \textit{erga omnes} as a reality of positive international law.\(^5\)

The legal consequences of the Court’s use of the characterization of an obligation as an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’ are twofold, in the context of the judgment in the case at hand.

\textbf{(a) First,} the right to bring claims on the basis of the breach of an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’ is predicated of any state party to the treaty, which implies that no other requirements must be fulfilled. This latter aspect, in particular, has two related; yet separate, implications, as follows:

(i) As for the invocation of responsibility, any state party to the treaty which constitutes the source of an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’ is entitled to invoke responsibility. This right to invoke responsibility encompasses, but is not exclusively, confined to, the right to bring a claim on the basis of the breach of such obligation before a given international court or tribunal.

(ii) As for the \textit{ius standi} to bring a claim in which responsibility is invoked for the breach of an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’, any state party to the treaty which constitutes the source of an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’ has \textit{ius standi}.

\textbf{(b) Secondly,} a claim arising from the breach of an ‘obligation \textit{erga omnes partes}’ is admissible in relation to any party to the treaty, regardless of whether it was ‘specially affected’ or ‘injured’. To the extent that issues of \textit{ius standi} and admissibility of claims, leaving aside specificities governed by the applicable procedural rules, depend on the finding as to whether there is (1) a legal interest, or, in the Court’s terms, ‘an interest’, in the performance of an obligation and (2) a right to invoke responsibility, this part will be confined to the study of these two latter elements. The right to react

\(^{1}\) - \textit{Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain)} Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3 at 32, para. 34.

\(^{2}\) - The ILC opts for the term not injured states. (ILC \textit{Articles on the Responsibility of States supra} n. 21 at 116). The terms non-directly affected, indirectly affected and not injured state, are used in the paper interchangeably.

\(^{3}\) - ILC \textit{Articles on the Responsibility of States}, Art. 48. See also the critical remarks by P.M. Dupuy on Art. 48. ‘The Deficiencies of the Law of State Responsibility Relating to Breaches of “Obligations Owed to the International Community as a Whole”: Suggestions for Avoiding the Obsolescence of Aggravated Responsibility’ in Cassese, supra n. 2 at 210.


against breaches of treaty obligations is regarded by some commentators as arising from the respective treaty, not from the nature of the obligation breached, particularly its alleged character as an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’.

This would be illustrated, as noted by some of the judges sitting in the Bench for the case in their statements, analysed above, by the lack of relevant state practice in the field of, for instance, inter-state proceedings before the Human Rights Committee, as states need not demonstrate that their obligation is an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, but simply that the treaty allows them to institute such proceedings. Indeed, some commentators have expressed that the question of identifying an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ and distinguishing it from ‘obligations erga omnes’ is irrelevant, insofar as ‘a treaty expressly recognizes a general legal interest or confers specific rights of protection’.

In this connection, Judge Tomka, in his previous capacity as member of the ILC, pointed out that “the existence of a legal interest would be a question of the interpretation or application of the relevant primary rules”.

4. Conclusion

The present paper has sought to demonstrate that the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, which it analyzed in terms of its definition, nature, sources and legal consequences of characterizations of an obligation as such, is, at best, redundant. In this sense, the present writer concurs with Judge Higgins observation that “[t]he Court’s celebrated dictum in Barcelona Traction … is frequently invoked for more than it can bear”. Indeed, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are only of significance if they are ‘obligations erga omnes’ proper, primarily in the form of customary obligations under general rules customary international law, binding on the parties to the treaty qua custom and regardless of any reservation, in addition to being binding on non-parties to the respective treaty to which the customary rule is opposable. Therefore, while the concept of obligation erga omnes proper, as set out in the dictum of the Court’s judgment in the Barcelona Traction case is predicable of obligation in the performance of which all the states have a common interest, the existence of a ‘common interest’ in relation to conventional obligations, particularly those of a multilateral character may lead to the same consequences to which the existence of an obligation erga omnes proper leads, particularly as to ius standi and admissibility of claims, yet does not turn the respective obligation into a new form of obligation erga omnes, nor is it the legal basis for findings as to ius standi and admissibility of claims, which remain to find their legal basis on the existence of a common interest in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Indeed, should such a legal basis exist under the treaty, the use of the concept of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ is devoid of purpose, as the rationale for the use of the concept of erga omnes was to “close an enforcement

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2 - Diego Germán Mejía-Lemos, A Commentar y on the Judgment of 20 July 2012 of the International Court of Justice in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal case), National University of Singapore, Singapur, 2014,p.206.
3 - Ibid., p. 125, stating: “Their right to react against treaty breaches exists because the respective treaties say so, not because of some special status of the obligation breached” (footnotes in the original omitted).
4 - Ibid., p. 125.
5 - United Nations International Law Commission, Summary record of the 2622nd meeting, para. 50
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gap”, which “is hardly necessary where a treaty expressly provides for standing in the public interest”. Hence, the question is not whether an obligation is ‘erga omnes partes’, which is likely to remain merely binding ‘erga partes’, or properly erga omnes, in which case there is no any need for a further characterization, but whether the treaty, in practice always multilateral, although the Court did not expressly rule out bilateral treaties from its definition, as noted above, accords the “each” and, in addition to the Court’s definition, “every”, state party a legally protected interest in the performance by each and every other state party of obligations under the treaty.

Reviewing of the changes of international resources shows us the vast events in international law. At the traditional structure of international law, every obligations just was recognized if states accept it as a contract or in customs. But, after changing of international atmosphere and in the revolution of the sovereignty nature, traditional structure of obligation in this field has been changed. This question is so fundamental why sates have been obligated without any consent. One of the most crucial of principles in international law and international relations rules is the consent of the states. Erga Omnes rules show what happened in this area. As written by Dr. Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, It is the potential this special type of international obligations has that mainly interests this article. The argument here is that obligations erga omnes may have far-reaching implications, allowing for change in a number of areas of international law. I agree with Dr. Vassilis P. Tzevelekos. As mentiond above, he believes they are opening the way to further objectification and do have the potential to fertilize the legal order with a series of innovative elements that affect the very essence of its systemic structure. The derivatives of that change vary. In his Idea, to name but a few of them, these would concern several domains of general international law, such as the informal hierarchy (of rules), jurisdiction, the obligation to execute and to comply with international judgments, etc. he added one would need a monograph to introduce in detail the idea of the ergaomnesisation of international law, but the bottom line of the argument could be summarized in the following way. The first step of the syllogism would be to recognize the link between the material importance of certain rules and the named class of obligations. Although the formal hierarchy (of sources) is foreign to international law, this does not mean that some rules are not created for – that is, their ratio legis, their purpose or raison d’etre is – the protection of certain interests and ideals that are thought to be of higher value, that is, more important than other ones. This leads to a first set of conclusions. My output in the article approved his idea and it is clear many evidence in the reality of international society presents it. Dr. Vassilis P. Tzevelekosw paid attention the reason erga omnes rules are receiving that special treatment within international law is of course their material content, as written by him. He added, however, the protection of their material content needed to be reconciled with (the preservation of) decentralization. In addition he presented that the outcome of that combination is a category of obligations owed erga omnes that recognize each and every state’s faculty to actively protect the values that are common to them. Thereby we can attract to his idea that all states within the decentralized order have their share in the protection. Thirdly, Dr. Vassilis P. Tzevelekos believes, erga omnes is contributing a communitarian tone in a society of individual sovereigns. And he added in his article that non-directly affected states are not (re)acting to the breach of an erga omnes obligation with an aim to protect individual interests that are exclusive to them, but interests and values that are common to their ensemble, that is, to the international community as a whole. I think his attraction is correct. But, many elements have been raised in this area. His idea about th how erga omnes is making possible the passage from a society of individuals into an – always decentralized – community of ‘stakeholders’ and this is how reciprocity cedes its place to collective enforcement is acceptable. Tzevelekosw believes “in that respect, erga omnes could be metaphorically understood as a special ‘capsule’ within which the system is placing only
those rules that are of significant material importance.” He explained: “this very ‘capsule’ acts in the same time as a ‘vehicle’, introducing – through the ‘backdoor’ – the idea of community within a decentralized order of sovereign individuals.” Also it has risen by him: “What will be the content of that ‘capsule’, that is to say what are the rules that will be given the special effect of erga omnes, is a question that goes beyond the article’s scope. “I also agree with him that said: “Questions such as what shapes trans-societal consensus, what is societal consensus, if this is universal or not, how can this be evidenced in a decentralized order and which are the philosophical foundations of the material content of these special rules escape the article, if not legal positivism as such.” He beautifully attracts readers that in simple words, and, although one cannot overlook the fact that erga omnes are closely linked to human rights, for the article, it is not the content of the ‘capsule’ that counts, but the ‘capsule’ as such. In his belief, it is the systemic tool that has been designed to encapsulate what, in the eyes of the society (of a given society, at a given time), is seen as important and worthy to be protected by each and every state acting in the name of all. I think in the erga_omnisation trend, at the future, many structures of resources would be changed. The consent of countries in making of their obligations will be changed in the nature as we can see at the present; some of them have been comprehended. Erga omnes (partes) has been located as the central with the humanization of international law.
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